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Abstract—While cryptocurrencies and blockchain applications
continue to gain popularity, their energy cost is evidently be-
coming unsustainable. In most instances, the main cost comes
from the required amount of energy for the Proof-of-Work, and
this cost is inherent to the design. In addition, useless costs
from discarded work (e.g., the so-called Forks) and lack of
scalability (in number of users and in rapid transactions) limit
their practical effectiveness.
In this paper, we present an innovative scheme which elimi-
nates the nonce and thus the burden of the Proof-of-Work which
is the main cause of the energy waste in cryptocurrencies such
as Bitcoin. We prove that our scheme guarantees a tunable and
bounded average number of simultaneous mining whatever the
size of the population in competition, thus by making the use of
nonce-based techniques unnecessary, achieves scalability without
the cost of consuming a large volume of energy. The technique
used in the proof of our scheme is based on the analogy of the
analysis of a green leader election. The additional difference with
Proof-of-Work schemes (beyond the suppression of the nonce
field that is triggering most of the waste), is the introduction
of (what we denote as) “empty blocks” which aim are to call
regular blocks following a staircase set of values. Our scheme
reduces the risk of Forks and provides tunable scalability for
the number of users and the speed of block generation. We also
prove using game theoretical analysis that our scheme is resilient
to unfair competitive investments (e.g., "51 percent" attack) and
block nursing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Popular cryptocurrencies have now been effectively in use
for more than ten years (e.g. Bitcoin [15]). In addition to
the increasing appetite for its key financial aspects (e.g., fast,
transparent, secure and private), their potential to facilitate,
verify, or enforce the negotiation or performance of various
transactions provides an important innovative service that will
have a disruptive impact for many applications.
Actual cryptocurrencies are completely decentralized proto-
cols. They are based on the blockchain concept where trans-
actions are regrouped by blocks and committed in a common
distributed directory connected in peer to peer organization. Its
novelty comes from the combination of existing concepts and
results from distributed computing, cryptography and game
theory. The transactions and the blocks are chained via a chain
of hash function which is too expensive to forge and falsify.
The blockchain allows that each block and each transaction
can be checked back by anyone as if there would be in a
gigantic distributed accounting book. The block has also the
function of tracing and controling the inflation of the Bitcoin
volume and facial value. This is done by giving a reward to
the block miner (the action of proposing a block) which is
accepted by distributed consensus when the block is “commit-
ted” (e.g., in Bitcoin, followed by six newer blocks). A block
within a forked branch that is not committed disappears.
One drawback of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin is the
moderation of block mining rate. With mining reward as a tool
in the control of volume of values, there is a fierce competition
in block mining. Some individuals may be tempted to mine
multiple blocks in order to augment their revenue or bend the
system in their favor (e.g., by double spending).
In order to avoid that too many simultaneous blocks are
mined and proposed for commitment, Bitcoin requires a “proof
of work” by forcing the block miner to execute a large
number of CPU cycles via iterated hash computations before
submitting his/her block. The idea of computational puzzle
as proof of work is not new, it appears first in the seminal
work of Dwork and Noar [9] and was later suggested to avoid
Sybil attack by Aspnes et al. [2]. The proof of work provides
scarcity and uniqueness that help reduce the individual block
mining rate.
However the “Proof of Work” (PoW) presently costs
100,000,000,000 CPU cycles (around 10 minutes on a current
PC) and if one million miners contend at the same time,
then the energy cost of mining one Bitcoin exceeds the value
of the Bitcoin itself. Furthermore this cost is expected to
quadratically grow or at least linearly grow with the number
of contending miners leading to a protocol whose energy cost
can absolutely not be sustainable in the near future.
In order to avoid these catastrophic consequences, a plethora
of alternatives have been suggested and analysed (e.g. [10],
[11]), including variants of proofs of stake (e.g., [6], [20]) or
various proofs of “something” (e.g., proof of Exercise [19]).
The later are difficult to implement since theydemand external
element of proof (fortune, volume and age of coins, etc) and
are difficult to extrapolate to blockchain system not related to
currencies. Other attempts to tackle the huge waste generated
by the Proof of Work as implemented in Bitcoin have been
aiming at turning them into work that is actually useful:
e.g., solving practical problems have been investigated in [3],
extended to present PoWs that are based on the Orthogonal
Vectors, 3SUM, and All-Pairs Shortest Path problems in [4],
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[5], and can be used to allow for much quicker verification
and zero-knowledge PoWs. Yet it is unclear how this creates
incentives for large amount of transactions, and how it guar-
antees Liveness (and in particular freedom from starvation if
no one volunteers to solve a practical problem). Also it still
remains paramount to reach agreement and to prevent double
spending while providing a way to mint the currency.
In this paper, we focus on the unsustainable energy cost
and propose a cryptocurrency protocol moderated through a
"green" mining protocol in such a way that it will remove the
prohibitive energy cost of the proof of work while keeping
the blockchain mining input rate between reasonable limits.
Those limits can be arbitrarily tuned a priori, while the proof
of work CPU parameter must be constantly updated. In fact
the system we propose can be applied to blockchain systems
not related to cryptocurrencies and which necessitate high
frequency updates [21].
Our validation of this scheme is inspired by “green” leader
elections [13], [14]. At its core our model implements a
scheme which guarantees a tunable and bounded average
number of simultaneous mining whatever the size of the pop-
ulation in competition, like a Leader Election. In addition to
public verifiability, our scheme provides liveness and fairness:
the unique chain grows and the probability of electing each
party is independent to its relative computational power. Our
model is “permissionless”: there is no explicit membership
protocol, anyone can join the system. Our model also offers the
safety property (blocks are eventually committed and cannot
be removed). Finally our scheme reduces the risk of Forks (di-
vergent chains of blocks that need to be eventually discarded)
and provides tunable scalability for the number of users and
the speed of block generation. Interestingly our scheme could
be adapted to the aspirational "Proof of Kernel" [22] which
consists into reducing the population allowed to contend for
mining. In this case the PoW is maintained but with a much
reduced difficulty just in order to prevent block forgery.
The exact contribution of our work and the structure of the
paper are as follows:
• We introduce our green blockchain protocol in Section II.
Our protocol uses a block generation scheme that does
not use a nonce in its Proof of Work. The novelty of our
protocol comes from a call field that regulates the rate
of creation of transaction blocks, in addition to empty
blocks.
• We prove the performance analysis of our protocol in
Section III. The methodology of the proof follows a
distributed leader election via collision scheme (that has
an interest on its own). The technique garantees a tunable
and bounded average number of simultaneous mining,
whatever the size of the population in competition for
block generation, thus offering full scalability.
• In section IV we present (in two steps) a protocol for
implicit empty blocks that renders the scheme completely
distributed, tunable and scalable. As the scheme also
reduces the chances of forks, it further reduces the
energy waste. We provide the performance analysis of
the implicit empty block scheme.
• In Section V, we prove the resilience of our scheme: as
energy wasting PoW farming is no longer possible with
our new scheme, we prove that block mining predators
that create attack by (what we call) "block nursing", have
such a low expectation of success that it renders attacks,
such as "51 percent" attack, prohibitive and unworthy.
• We give concluding remarks and highlight future works
in Section VI.
II. THE GREEN COIN MINING PROTOCOL
A. Parameters and format
Our Green Coin protocol is based on the following param-
eters:
• an integer k;
• a vector of increasing probabilities of length k + 1:
P0, P1, . . . , Pk, with Pk = 1;
• an upper bound N on the maximum admissible number
of contending blocks, that can be set as large as possible.
Typical values for these parameters would be k = 8, N =
232 are examples. The green coin leader protocol consists in
authorizing the mining of an average number of order N1/k
out of n ≤ N contending blocks.
As per Bitcoin, each block of the Green Coin protocol will
carry some values obtained by hash function. We denote h the
length of the hash value fields in the block. A typical value is
h = 256 (32 bytes). But while Bitcoin has only one kind of
block, Green Coin relies on two kinds of blocks:
• the regular block containing transactions;
• the empty block which does not contain any transactions.
The regular block format is similar to Bitcoin block format
but with the difference that it does not contain a nonce field but
instead a call field. The call field dictates the required criteria
for the next hash value field. The following table gives an
abstract format listing the most significant fields:
1 hash of previous block
2 date
3 list of transactions
... ...
4 call value
5 hash of the block
The empty block looks similar but with no transaction list.
1 hash of previous block
2 date
3 call value
4 hash of the block
B. Mining protocol
Initially, to simplify our presentation, we will assume that
empty slots are mined by a central entity and on a restricted
block server. We will discuss later how the protocol can be
made distributed or how to face forgery.
A block can be mined only if its hash value is smaller
than the call value of the previous block. The call field of a
regular block has always the same value which is b2h+1P0c−
1. If no regular block is mined, after a certain lapse of time
the central entity mines an empty block. Unlike regular block
hash values, an empty block hash value does not need to be
smaller than the call value of the previous block. The call
value of the first empty block should have value b2h+1P1c−1.
As long as no new regular block is mined, the central entity
mines empty block with successive call values b2h+1P2c −
1, . . . , b2h+1Pkc − 1. After k mined empty blocks the call
values sequence restarts.
There are three facts that are worth noting:
• as there is no nonce field in the regular block there is no
proof of work computation required,
• instead, the blocks are authorized via the call values
which have the effect of regulating the mining rate,
• the non-authorized blocks do not need to be submitted
and this limits also the traffic generated by the block
mining.
Liveness. If a call fails, i.e. no regular block is mined, then
a new call will be made via a new empty block. Since Pk =
1, the last call value is the max-value 2h+1 − 1. Therefore
any competition of block mining will result in at least one
block mined. Figure 1 displays an example of block sequences
in the blockchain. The chain is enforced by the hash values
Y0, Y1, . . . The value of a regular block hash should always be
smaller than the call value of the previous block, regardless it
is empty or regular. Empty blocks do not need to follow this
rule.
Fig. 1: A sequence of blocks, empty blocks are grayed/yellow.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS USING LEADER ELECTION
A. Analogy of a classic leader election via collision
Let us introduce a game of leader election to analyse the
performance of our protocol and its scalability. The goal of
leader election (e.g., [12], [18]) is to select one among n > 0
players, by proceeding through a number of rounds. Note that
using rounds is also commonly accepted that the Blockchain
model incorporates some degree of synchrony assumptions:
in a network with unbounded delay, the adversary can boost
its power just by making the non-faulty parties incur higher
delays (e.g., [8]). We will show that these assumptions are
actually unnecessary for our complete scheme in Section IV.
Informally, the rounds of our leader election are made via
coin tossing. We assume that each competitor has a coin whose
head probability is p and tail probability q = 1−p. We want to
proceed to a leader election among n ≥ 1 competitors. At the
beginning all the n competitors transmit. If this results into
a collision then each competitor tosses the coin, only those
who get a head contend for the second round, we call them
the survivors. If the second round results in a collision, then a
second coin tossing occurs and a subset of survivors contend,
and the protocol continues until none survive. In this case we
take as result the last non empty set of survivors.
Usually there is an additional procedure in order to reduce
the survivor population to a single leader using a collision
algorithm. In our case, this is not necessary as long as the
subset of survivor is of reasonable size: we will prove using
analytic combinatorics that the average size of the last non
empty survivor set is qp log(1/p) with some fluctuations of small
amplitude. Note that this value is finite and independent of
the initial number contenders (although small fluctuations may
enlight some non trivial dependencies). This number can also
be tuned to be small or large by tuning the parameter p. This
can be done by compromising with the average number of
rounds which tends to log1/p n when n→∞.
If we wanted to imitate this process for the call values in
the empty block, we will need a sequence (P0, P1, . . .) such
that P` = p` represents an exponential descending staircase
but this will create the case that after the first call one would
have already n mined blocks.
However we can use our protocol to create the ascending
exponential staircase effect when there is a large yet fixed limit
N to the number of simultaneous contenders. In this case we
suppose that P0 = 1N and that P` =
1
N p
−` for ` ≤ k. In order
to have Pk = 1 one must have p = 1N1/k . If N = 2
32 and
k = 8 we will have p = 116 and the call sequence will be:
call value rank Probability sequence call value
0 ≤ ` ≤ k = 8 P` = N `k−1 b2h+1.P`c − 1
0 (initial) 2−32 2224 − 1
1 2−28 2228 − 1
2 2−24 2232 − 1
3 2−20 2236 − 1
4 2−16 2240 − 1
5 2−12 2244 − 1
6 2−8 2248 − 1
7 2−4 2232 − 1
8 1 2256 − 1
We denoteMn the average number of regular mined block
when n blocks are in competition after a regular block. Note
that an important yet regular assumption in this paper is that
successive calls of a hashing function are independent. Of
course stricto sensu this is not true since hash value deter-
minations are deterministic computations, but traditionally the
better successive hash values imitates independent random
variables, the better is a hash function. In fact this argument
is the foundation for accepting the resilience of blockchains
(made of successive hash computations) against attacks.
Let M`n denote the number of blocks mined after the
`th empty block under the condition that all the previous
empty blocks resulted into no regular block mined. We have
Mn =M
0
n and since Pk = 1:M
k
n = n. Since the fact that the
successive calls to hash values are assumed independent, the
number of blocks called by the `th empty block is a binomial
random variable B(n, P`) of probability P`. For ` < k when
the binomial variable is B(n, P`) = 0 which occurs with
probability (1 − P`)n, no block is mined after the `th block
and M`n =M
`−1
n . Thus for all integers m, m > 0:
P (M`n = m) =
(
n
m
)
Pm` (1− P`)n−m
+(1− P`)nP (M`+1n = m) (1)
and
P (M`n = 0) = δ(n). (2)
where δ(n) = 1 if n = 0 and zero otherwise, also known as
Kroenecker symbol.
Let M `n(u) = E[u
M`n ].
Lemma 1: We have for ` < k
M `n(u) = (1 + P`(u− 1))n − (1− P`)n
+(1− P`)nM `+1n (u)
and Mkn(u) = u
n.
Proof: This is a direct application of Equation (1).
Lemma 2: We have the identity
E[Mn] = nP0 +
`=k∑
`=1
nP`
∏
j<`
(1− Pj)n (3)
Proof: This is a direct application of previous lemma by
using E[uMn ] = E[uM
0
n ] and E[uM
`
n ] = ∂∂uM
`
n(1).
Theorem 1: For all n ≤ N , we have the estimate
E[Mn] = O(N
1/k).
Remark: the optimal value is k = O(logN) but lower
values of integer k are already interesting.
Proof: From Equation 3 we get the inequalities
E[Mn] ≤ nP0 +
k∑
`=1
nP`(1− P`−1)n
≤ nP0 +
∑
1≤`≤k
nP` exp (−P`−1n) .
The quantity
∑
1≤`≤k nP` exp(−P`−1n) is equal to∑
1≤`≤k
n
N
p` exp(−p`−1n/N).
This quantity is smaller than f(n/N) with f(x) =
1
p
∑
`∈Z g(p
`x) with g(x) = xe−x. The function f(ex) is
periodic of period log p and therefore is bounded.
Since p = N−1/k, n/N ≤ 1 and n ≤ N , we get
E[Mn] = O(N
1/k).
Theorem 2: We have the more precise estimate
E[Mn] ≤ n
N
+AN1/k. (4)
with A = 1log(1/p)
∑
k∈Z |Γ (1 + 2ikpi/ log p)|, p denoting
N−1/k and where Γ(.) is the Euler "Gamma" function.
Proof: We can give an accurate estimate of the maximum
value of function f(x). The function f(ex) is periodic of
period log p and therefore has a Fourier decomposition:
f(ex) =
∑
k∈
gke
2ikpix/ log p (5)
where gk is the Fourier coefficient.
We have
gk =
∫ 0
log p
f(ex)e2ikpi/ log pdx
=
1
log(1/p)
∫ ∞
0
g(x)2ikpi/ log p−1dx
=
1
log(1/p)
Γ (1 + 2ikpi/ log p)
and then use the upper bound |f(ex)| ≤∑k∈Z |gk|.
In passing we get the mean value of f(ex) to be equal to
g0 =
1
log(1/p) .
Figure 2 shows the quantity E[Mn] versus n for various
parameters. Notice that the sequence of bumps reflects the
periodic fluctuations as function of log n analyzed in the upper
bound.
Figure 3 shows the same quantities obtained by simulation,
each point being simulated 1,000 times.
In fact, we can give a close expression of the distribution
of Mn.
Lemma 3: For all complex number u:
E[uMn ] = (1 + P0(u− 1))n − (1− P0)n
+
∑
0<`<k
∏
j<`
(1− Pj)n
× ((1 + P`(u− 1))n − (1− P`)n)
+un
∏
j<k
(1− Pj)n.
Proof: By application of Lemma 1.
Figure 4 displays the various shape of the sequences P (Mn >
m) versus integer m for various parameters. Notice that the
sequence of descending bumps in the plots comes from the
mixture of the different binomial distributions.
We can also give an estimate of the exponential tail distribu-
tion of Mn by the following theorem about large deviations.
Theorem 3: Let p = N−1/k. For all integer m > 0, we have
the estimate
P (Mn > m) ≤ k + e
p
(1 + p)m
(6)
Proof: We have P` = pk−` and
E[uMn ] ≤ (1 + pk(u− 1))n − (1− pk)n +∑
0<`<k
((
1 + p`(u− 1)
)n − (1− p`)n) (1− p`+1)n
+un(1− p)n
Let u = 1 + p, we have
1 + (u− 1)p` = 1 + p`+1
Fig. 2: The quantity E[Mn] and the upper bound given by (4)
in red versus n for N = 232, (top) for k = 8, (middle) k = 12,
(bottom) k = 16.
and therefore
(1 + (u− 1)p`)(1− p`+1) = 1− p2(`+1) ≤ 1.
Thus E[uMn ] ≤ (1 + pk+1)n + k.
Since (1+pk+1)n ≤ exp(npk+1) = exp(pn/N) and n < N
we have
exp(np/N) ≤ exp(N−1/k).
We conclude the proof with the observation that for all integer
m:
umP (Mn > m) ≤ E[uMn ].
Figure 5 displays the histograms of 1,000 simulations of Mn
versus n for N = 232 and k = 8, 12, 16. The color of the point
(n,m) indicates the number of times the event Mn = m has
been obtained during the simulation with the color code: black
when more than 64 times, red when between 16 and 64, blue
when between 4 and 16, green when between 1 and 4.
IV. DECENTRALIZED EMPTY BLOCK MINING
For the sake of simplicity, we have initially described our
scheme with a requirement to have a central authority to create
and mine empty blocks. We now remove this constraint by
Fig. 3: The same as in figure 2 E[Mn] with N = 232 but
obtained with 1,000 simulations per point, (top) for k = 8,
(middle) k = 12, (bottom) k = 16.
making the empty block creation fully distributed. For the
sake of clarity, we extend our scheme in two steps (with the
introduction of two features):
• (A) Time moderated empty blocks mining;
• (B) implicit empty blocks mining.
A. Time moderated empty block mining
In this extended scheme, now all entities can mine empty
blocks. In this case in order to avoid unfairness between empty
miners, a new empty block will be allowed only if its date is
above a minimal gap time between the last full and empty
block time. For comparison with other existing schemes, the
Minimal Gap Time (MGT) can be set to one minute (e.g.,
in Bitcoin this is called the Block Time, the average time
between blocks, and the difficulty of the PoW is adjusted to
make the time about 10 minutes; while the block time for
Ethereum is set to between 14 and 15 seconds). Note that, in
this case, we still need to have at least one entity mining empty
blocks to guarantee liveness. Hence for this first variation we
assume that possibly several (and at least one) peer-nodes
Fig. 4: Computed values of P (Mn > m) with upperbound
given by (6) in red versus m for n = 10, 000, with N = 232,
(left) for k = 8, (right) k = 12, (bottom) k = 16.
generates empty blocks and thus play the role of a distributed
timestamping and block servers.
Time can be captured using Unix universal time (POSIX),
a widely used time-stamping system in Unix-like and many
other operating systems and file formats, that is commonly
used for Blockchain systems. However, one difficulty is that
the date given by the clock is not mandatorily accurate (e.g.,
Unix time is not a true representation of UTC, and leap
seconds are not accounted for). However note we are only
interested in the time difference in this part. One possibility is
that an additional time stamp is added to the block in order to
reflect the local time when the timestamping server received
the block. Of course, since the timestamping server’s time
is local, it can only be added at the reception and will be
excluded from the hash value computation of the block. An
empty block received before the expiration of the minimum
time gap with the local time of the timestamping server will
be delayed. An empty block with a time stamp which does
not show the MGT offset with the original time stamp of a
full block will be discarded.
Also the date field of the empty blocks must be excluded
Fig. 5: various values of Mn versus n simulated 1000 times
black values appeared more than 64 times, red more than 16
times, blue more than 4 times, green more than once, with
N = 232, (top) for k = 8, (middle) k = 12, (bottom) k = 16.
from their hash value computation. Otherwise full blocks with
very different hash values could be called by different empty
blocks on different peers just because the latter show different
hash value due to different time stamps. Hence the sequence of
hash values of the empty blocks mined after a full block will
follow a deterministic sequence. If we ignore the clock drifts,
the use of the time stamp does not change the performance
analysis of the scheme as we retain the important property that
two consecutive calls to hash function generate independent
hash values.
B. Implicit empty block mining
We can now extend the previous scheme by exploiting the
fact that the sequence of hash values of the empty blocks
mined after a full block will follow a deterministic sequence,
and thus make them “implicit”. In addition, and finally, we
remove completely the requirement of any special or central-
ized entity and make the scheme fully distributed: one does
not need a special or central entity to initiate empty blocks
since empty blocks will now become implicit, i.e. no empty
blocks will be mined. The modification of the protocol is the
following:
• Upon reception of a full block within less than one MGT
after the mining of the last full block, the block server
discards it;
• Upon reception of a full block within less than ` MGT
(1 ≤ ` ≤ k) after the mining of the last full block, with
either new block’s hash value is larger than 2hP`−1 or
the previous block hash value is not the hash value of the
last full block, the block server discards it.
Note that another advantage of this scheme is that it also
minimises the risk of creating forks as full blocks are discarded
earlier.
C. Performance analysis of the implicit empty block scheme
The main difference with the previous scheme analysis is
that the hash value of the blocks after each empty block are
no longer independent. In fact the hash value of a full block
candidate is no longer possibly related to a new empty block.
Indeed the previous block hash value field is no longer the
hash value of the previous empty block, since it does no
longer exists, but the hash value of the last full block. Keeping
the previous notations we can state our main theorems and
lemmas.
Lemma 4: For m > 0 we have the expression
P (Mn = m) =
(
n
m
)
Pm0 (1− P0)n−m
+
k−1∑
`=1
(
n
m
)
(P` − P`−1)m(1− P`)n−m
+δ(m− n)(1− Pk−1)n
Proof: We call slot the time interval of length MGT. Let
assume that n full blocks are in competition. Let 0 < ` <
k, the probability that a block has a hash value comprised
between 2hP`−1 and 2hP` is P` − P`−1. Such a block will
be mined on the `+ 1-th slots after the last full block if and
only if all the other full blocks in competition have their hash
values greater than or equal to 2hP`. Those which have the
hash value greater than 2hP` will not be mined. The hash
values of the blocks being assumed independent justifies the
binomial expression. The case ` = 0 corresponds to blocks
which have value smaller than or equal to 2hP0. In the case
` = k we have Pk = 1 and occur when all the blocks have
hash values greater than or equal to 2hPk−1
Lemma 5: We have the expression:
E[Mn] = nP0 +
k∑
`=1
n(P` − P`−1)(1− P`−1)n−1. (7)
Proof: This is a direct expression of the previous lemma.
We have E[Mn] = ∂∂uE[u
Mn ]|u=1. Indeed for u complex:∑
m
um
(
n
m
)
(P` − P`−1)m(1− P`−1)n−m =
((P` − P`−1)u+ 1− P`−1)n
Fig. 6: Average number E[Mn] of mined blocks with explicit
(green) and implicit (red) empty blocks mining versus n for
k = 16.
and the derivative of the right hand side with respect to variable
u is equal to n(P` − P`−1)((P` − P`−1)u+ 1− P`)n−1. We
notice that when ` = k we have
n(P` − P`−1)(1− P`−1)n−1 = n(1− Pk−1)n
since Pk = 1.
The performance of the implicit empty blocks strategy are
comparable to the performance of the explicit empty blocks.
In fact we see that the plots of the average number of mined
blocks oscillate and cross each other when we compare both
strategy (see Figure 6).
Theorem 4: For n ≤ N we have the property:
E[Mn] = O(N
1/k).
Proof: We have
E[Mn]− P0n =
k∑
`=1
n(P` − P`−1)(1− P`)n−1.
Since P` = pk−` and pk = 1/N we get
E[Mn]− n
N
=
k∑
`=1
n(1/p− 1)P`(1− P`−1)n−1
=
k∑
`=1
n(1/p− 1)P` (1− P`−1)
n
(1− P`−1)
≤ 1
p
k∑
`=1
nP`(1− P`−1)n
since (1− P`−1)−1 ≤ (1− p)−1.
We recognize in the last right hand term an expression
which we have already proven to be O(N1/k) in the proof
of Theorem 1.
Using the same reasoning, we obtain a more precise estimate
via the use of the "Gamma" function:
E[Mn] ≤ n
N
+BN1/k
with
B =
1
p log(1/p)
∑
k∈Z
∣∣∣∣Γ(1 + 2ikpilog p
)∣∣∣∣ . (8)
V. GAME THEORETIC APPROACH FOR BLOCK NURSING, 51
PERCENT ATTACK
A. The "51 percent" attack
With the nonce disappearing in our scheme (from the
internal format of the block that is hashed), any Proof of
Work farming is no longer possible in order to achieve a
competitive advantage in the mining contest. Indeed to change
the hash function of the block, there is a need to change
the content of the block, i.e. the Merkel tree representing
the transaction confirmed by the block. In order to make the
task even more difficult one can enforce the rule that the
Merkel tree represents an ordered list of transactions. Under
this condition modifying the hash function would need to
modify the set of transactions contained in the block. This
would make block nursing far less easy than proof of work
farming since transaction identifiers should be distributed in
caches while proof of work only require local increments of
the nounce integer.
Nevertheless the proof of work farming could be replaced
by block nursing. Instead of working on a single block and
changing its hash function via the nonce, an institution pre-
pares a set of blocks with different transaction combinations,
since it is the only way to modify the block hash function.
Nursing blocks will have a higher cost per hash function
than with Proof of Work farming, since one has to access
and retrieve transaction IDs. Furthermore not every transaction
combination may be permitted, and some may not be interest-
ing, resulting into an unacceptably low income. Also the set
of currently available transactions may not be large enough
to offer enough combinations. However, in the following we
will assume that we have no such limit and assess the risk of
nursing blocks.
In this section we analyse the so-called 51 percent attack.
It consists to measure the additional means in terms of
processing power block nurse must commit in order to gain
one term  in the probability of prevailing against an adversary
nurse.
We will prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5: if the adversaries are of equivalent power then
one adversary increases of  of its probability to win a block
mining needs an increase of 1−p
2
2p log(1/p) of the size of block
nurse factory.
We notice that if p is small the amplifying factor can be large.
for p = 2−32/k for k = 8, 12, 16 we respectively get an
amplification factor of 6.64, 3.95, 3.32.
B. Detailed analysis
Let A be a competitor nursing m blocks and B another
competitor B nursing n blocks, let Lm,n be the probability
Lm,n of A losing for a block mining against B. We will show
that the quantity Lm,n starts to decrease significantly only
when m is of the order n/p. Since in the above examples one
has 1/p greater than 4 or more, this would require a major
investment compared to B. In reciprocity if B wants to balance
with A, it would be sufficient that B invests a little more than
p times A’s investment. Furthermore 1/Lm,n is the average
length of consecutive mined blocks of miner A against miner
B. It estimates the ability of miner A to have committed blocks
and fork from miner B to take the lead on the currency.
We give the following theorem in the context of explicit
empty block mining, where the consecutive hash values are
assumed to be independent random variables.
Theorem 6: We have Lm,n asymptotically larger than L(x)
where x = m/n and
L(x) =
log((x+ p)p)− log(px+ 1)
2 log p
(1 +Q(log x))
with Q(.) a periodic function of small amplitude and period
log(1/p).
Proof: We provide the main steps of the proof. After each
non empty mined block there is a potential sequence of k slots,
called with empty blocks, to insert the next non empty block.
If the calls make that A inserts a block on a slot before the
slot of B, A wins the mining. If A and B select the same
slot, A and B either win or loose with probability 1/2. (Note
that for the sake of the explanation here, and without loss
of generality, we assume that A and B mine only one block
each.)
If we assume that the all hash function for the blocks nursed
by A are independent, the probability that A mines a block on
the first slot is 1− (1− P0)m, the probability that it mines a
block on slot ` is (1−P0)m×· · ·×(1−P`−1)m(1−(1−P`)m).
At the same time the probability that the competitor B mines
a block on slot ` is also (1 − P0)n · · · (1 − P`−1)n(1 − (1 −
P`)
n). The probability that a competitor mines a block on a
further slot is (1− P0)n · · · (1− P`−1)n(1− P`)n. Therefore
the probability that player A mines a block at slot ` and wins
against B is equal to the sum of half of the first probability
plus the second probability, namely 12 (1 − P0)n+m · · · (1 −
P`−1)n+m(1− (1− P`)n)(1 + (1− P`)m):
Lm,n =
1
2
(1− (1− P0)n)(1 + (1− P0)m)
+
1
2
k∑
`=1
(1− P0)n+m · · · (1− P`−1)n+m
×(1− (1− P`)n)(1 + (1− P`)m)
Thus we get
Lm,n =
1
2
k∑
`=0
(1− (1− p`)n)(1 + (1− p`)m)
×
k∏
i>`
(1− pi)n+m
≥ 1
2
k∑
`=0
(1− (1− p`)n)(1 + (1− p`)m)
×(1− p
`+1
1− p )
n+m
Since pk = 1/N , we have
Ln,m ≥ Lx(n) +O(n/N).
with
Lx(n) =
1
2
∑
`≥0
(1−(1−p`)n)(1+(1−p`)nx)(1− p
`+1
1− p )
(1+x)n.
The Mellin transform of Lx(n) with respect to variable n is
L∗x(s) =
Γ(s)
2
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
(−1)iLi,jx (s)
with
Li,jx (s) =
∑
`≥0
(
−(1 + x) log(1− p
`+1
1− p )− (i+ jx) log(1− p
`)
)−s
since Li,jx (s) =
((1+x) p1−p+(i+jx))
−s
1−p−s +O(<(s)).
The function L∗(s) has therefore a pole at a s = 0 and
at integer multiples of 2ipi/ log p. The pole at s = 0 gives a
contribution to the asymptotic of Lx(n), when n→∞, which
is ∑1
i=0
∑1
j=0(−1)i log
(
(1 + x) p1−p + (i+ jx)
)
2 log p
= L(x)
The other poles contributes to the periodic term Q(log x).
We notice that
L(1) = 1/2,
L(1/p) =
log(1 + p2)− log 2
2 log p
≈ log 2
2 log(1/p)
,
lim
x→0
L(x) = 1,
lim
x→∞L(x) = 0,
L(x) ∼ p− 1/p
2x log p
,when x→∞,
L(x) = 1 +
x
2p log p
+O(x2),when x→ 0.
The last identity proves the 51 percent result of Theorem 5
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a new blockchain scheme which gets
rid of the overwhelming waste of energy created by the Proof
of Work used in Blockchain protocols such as Bitcoin. The
technique used for the proof of our scheme is based on the
analysis of a distributed Green Leader Election (which is of
interest on its own).
The main difference with Bitcoin-like Proof-of-Work
schemes beyond the suppression of the nonce field (triggering
most of the waste), is the introduction of empty blocks which
aims are to call regular blocks following a controlled staircase
set of values. In a simplified approach (that can be relevant for
some particular sets of applications or peers), the security of
the scheme comes from a secured repository of mined empty
Fig. 7: Function L(x) (up), function Lm,n for n = 10, 000
(down), both with N = 232 and k = 8.
blocks by a single authority. Hence we also introduced and
analysed a completely distributed block mining protocol that
uses an implicit empty block mining which does not need any
central authority.
With the disappearance of the nonce in the proof of work,
we also consider attacks on the cryptocurrency where it would
take other variants of proof of work farming. We analysed the
performance of a new strategy, which we name "block nursing"
to prove that it will be inherently more complicated than proof
of work farming and much less rewarding.
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